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EVIDENCE-SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-
TESTIMONIAL TRUMPS RELIABLE: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
RECONSIDERS ITS APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."'
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is composed of just
these eighteen words, yet this small phrase has been an enigma for the
United States Supreme Court for many years.' Over the past half century the
Court has merged an absolute constitutional right with the rule against hear-
say. 3 In doing so the Court has subjected the categoneal ight of coafronta-
tion to a "malleable standard" of evidence law that "often fails to protect
against paradigmatic confrontation violations." 4 Since its formalization in
Ohio v. Roberts,5 this approach has rendered inconsistent and contradictory
results and has increasingly drawn the attention of critics who have advo-
cated a return to the original ideas behind the Clause.6 By its recent decision
in Crawford v. Washington, the Court attempted to remedy some of the
problems resulting from Roberts.7 In Crawford the Court returned to an
examination of the historical influences behind the Confrontation Clause
and formulated a doctrine that should appease the historical advocates while
remaining applicable to modern criminal procedure concerns.8
1. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. VI.
2. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 539
(2003). At least some of the confusion over the Confrontation Clause has been blamed on its
very murky origins. See Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 67, 67-68 (1969). Unlike many other constitutional provisions, the Confronta-
tion Clause is somewhat unclear from its text and there is very little documentation to ex-
plain the framers' reasoning behind its inclusion in the Sixth Amendment. Id.
3. White, supra note 2, at 539.
4. See Crawford v. Washingtoo, 541 U.S. 26 (2004) ("Crawford III').
5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
6. CrawfordIII, 541 U.S. at 59.
7. See id. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the Court, Id. at 1356. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined. Id at 1374
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
8. See infra Part IV.A.
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This note examines the inestimable significance of Crawford v. Wash-
ington9 to evidentiary procedures in the criminal justice system. The note
first briefly summarizes the facts behind the Crawford case and the twisted
procedural history that it traversed on its way to a grant of certiorari.' 0 Next,
the note tracks the history of the Confrontation Clause from its English and
American Colonial origins through the case law leading up to the establish-
ment of the Roberts doctrine." This historical trek sets the stage for an ex-
amination of the Court's analysis in the Crawford decision. 2 The note con-
cludes with a discussion of the promises of the Crawford approach, the re-
sulting problems it may create in its application, and a discussion of the new




On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford, accompanied by his wife Syl-
via Crawford, went to the apartment of Kenneth Lee.' 4 An argument ensued,
and Michael stabbed Kenneth.' 5 Later that evening, the police picked the
couple up and, when they arrived at the police department, the police sepa-
rated the couple for questioning.' 6 During interrogation each gave separate
tape-recorded statements. 17 The couple's first story was that the two had
gone to visit Lee, and while Michael went to the store, Kenneth tried to
sexually assault Sylvia. Michael then returned and the fight occurred. 18 Both
Michael and Sylvia gave roughly the same story; the police, however, de-
cided to take a second statement from each of them due to some discrepan-
cies. 19 The second set of stories differed greatly from the first.2 °
9. 541 U.S. at 36.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-
9410).
15. Id. Lee sustained severe injuries to his stomach. Id. During the altercation, Sylvia's
sweater got blood on it, and Michael's hand was deeply cut, requiring twelve stitches to close
the wound. Id. Michael could not recall how he received the cut, but he indicated that it
might have been from a weapon that Lee was carrying. Joint Appendix at 155, Crawford III
(No. 02-9410). In Sylvia's second statement to the police she indicated that Michael might
have cut himself while stabbing Lee. Id. at 137.
16. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Crawford Il (No. 02-9410).
17. Id.
18. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-I1., 2001 WL 850119, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July
30, 2001) ("Crawfordl").
19. Joint Appendix at 127, Crawford III (No. 02-9410).
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The couple's second accounts of the incident revealed that the alleged
sexual assault had actually occurred weeks earlier.2 1 Both stated that while
visiting with friends earlier that day, Lee's name arose in conversation and
Michael became angry.22 The two then went in search of Lee. When they
23arrived at his house, the fight started and Michael stabbed Lee. The stories
diverged on the point of whether or not Lee actualty brandished a weapon
while Michael was stabbing him-Michael claimed that Lee might have
been holding a weapon during the fight.24 Sylvia, however, indicated that
Lee might not have grabbed for a weapon until after Michael had assaulted
him.25 Michael was charged with one count of attempted first degree murder
20. See Crawford 1, 2001 WL 850119, at * 1. The first and second statements were taken
a few hours apart, and Sylvia's were always taken before Michael's-Sylvia's at 7:03 p.m.
and 10:43 pm., and Michael's at 8:00 p.m. and approximately 12:45 a.m. Joint Appendix at
79, 98, 124, 142 Crawford III (No. 02-9410).
21. Crawfordl,2001 WL850119,at*1.
22. Id. According to Sylvia's second statement, the couple had been drinking, and Mi-
chae was "past tipsy." S1oint Append-Y at 132, Crawford Iff (Ne. 02-941AV). She a !, reparted
that when Lee's name came up, Michael declared that he needed an "ass whoopin."' Id at
131.
23. Joint Appendix at 132-33, Crawford II (No. 02-9410).
24. See id. at 137.
25. See id. at 155. Michael's second statement read as follows:
Q: okay. Did you ever see anything in his hands
A: I think so, but I'm not positive
Q: okay, when you think so, what do you mean by that
A: I could a swore I seen him goin' for somethin' before, right before everything
happened. He was like reachin', fiddlin' around down here and stuff... I don't
know, I think, this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that he pulled some-
thin' out and I grabbed for it and that's how I got cut.., but I'm not positive. I, I
my mind goes blank when things like this happen. I mean, I just, I remember
things wrong, I remember things that just doesn't, don't make sense to me later.
Joint Appendix at 155, CrawfordIII (No. 02-9410).
Sylvia's second statement read as follows:
Q: did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault
A: (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket . . .or somethin' . • • I don't
know what
Q: after he was stabbed
A: he saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand... his chest open, he might of
went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inaudible)
Q: okay, you, you gotta speak up
A: okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael's hand down
or something and then he put his hands in his.., put his right hand in his right
pocket ... took a step back... Michael proceeded to stab him.., then his hands
were like... how do you explain this... open arms... with his hands open and
he fell down... and we ran (describing subject holding hands open, palms to-
ward assailant)
Q: okay, when he's standing there with his open hands you're talking about
Kenny, correct
A: yeah after, after the fact, yes
20051
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with a deadly weapon and one count of first degree assault with a deadly
26weapon. 6
B. Procedural Posture
1. The Trial Court
At trial Michael pleaded self-defense and invoked the marital privilege
under Washington evidence law to prevent Sylvia from testifying.27 In re-
sponse the prosecution sought to admit both of Sylvia's statements into evi-
dence under the hearsay exception of statements against penal interest;2 8 the
defense objected on the grounds that this would implicate Michael's rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.29 Under the
United States Supreme Court decision Ohio v. Roberts,30 an out-of-court
statement of an unavailable witness could be admitted when the statement
bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability."' 3 The reliability test could be satis-
fied if the statement (1) fell within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
,,32 tracot
(2) bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The trial court
determined that Sylvia's statement did not fall into a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" after considering the Supreme Court's ruling in Lilly v. Vir-
ginia,33 but it did find the statement trustworthy enough to bypass cross-
examination under the Sixth Amendment. 34 The court allowed both of Syl-
via's statements to be admitted, declaring them reliable because Sylvia was
Q: did you see anything in his hands at that point
A: (pausing) urn urn (no)
Joint Appendix at 137, Crawford 1 (No. 02-94 10).
26. Joint Appendix at 1, Crawford III (No. 02-9410).
27. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002) ("Crawford I"). The marital
privilege that Michael invoked is codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West
1995).
A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife, without the consent of
the wife, nor a wife for or against her husband without the consent of the hus-
band; nor can either during marriage or afterward, be without consent of the
other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during mar-
riage.
Id.
28. See Joint Appendix at 61, Crawford ll (No. 02-9410). The trial court found that the
statements were against Sylvia's penal interest because she acted as an accomplice by lead-
ing Michael to the scene of the crime and aiding him in his escape. Id.
29. Crawfordll, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1358 (2004).
30. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra Part III.B.3. for a discussion of the Roberts decision.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id.
33. 527 U.S. 116, 127 (1999) (holding that the category of statements against penal
interest is too broad to be considered a "firmly rooted hearsay exception").
34. CrawfordIII, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
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not attempting to inculpate her husband and exculpate herself; rather, she
was trying to support him by corroborating his story.35 The prosecution ad-
mitted the evidence, and the jury returned a verdict finding Michael guilty
of first degree assault with a deadly weapon.
36
2. The Court of Appeals of Washington
On appeal Michael again challenged the trial court's admission of Syl-
via's statements as a violation of his right to confrontation.37 The Court of
Appeals of Washington analyzed the reliability of the statements using a
nine factor test designed to show "particularized guaranties of trustworthi-
ness." 38 The court found that Sylvia's statements failed the test and were not
admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 39 Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals reversed Michael's conviction.40
3. The Supreme Court of Washington
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the appellate division's
decision.41 While acknowledging the nine factor test used by the Appellate
35. Joint Appendix at 60-61, Crawford Xl (No. 02-9410). The trial judge did seem to
show some hesitance towards allowing the admission of the statement, stating:
So when I take the statement of Sylvia Crawford in the context of the statement
of the Defendant Crawford, I do not find that it is unreliable and untrustworthy.
It's not dissimilar to the defendant's own statement. When I take it in a vacuum,
not measured against any other evidence known at the time or understood at the
time, I think it's a closer call.
Id. at 61. Also, the trial judge recommended that the prosecution not admit Sylvia's state-
nents to avoid possible error on appeal. Id. at 62. He suggested that in the alternative the
state could rely on the statements made by Michael Crawford and the testimony of the al-
leged victim, Kenneth Lee. Id.
36. CrawfordI1, 541 U.S. at 40 (2004).
37. Crawford I, No. 25307-1-I, 2001 WL 850119, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30,
2001).
38. Id. at *4. The failure of any one of the nine factors was not dispositive. Id. The
factors were (1) whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie, (2) whether the decla-
rant's general character suggests trustworthiness, (3) whether more than one person heard the
statement, (4) whether the declarant made the statement spontaneously, (5) whether the tim-
ing of the statements and the relationship between the declarant and the witness suggests
trustworthiness, (6) whether the statement contained express assertions of past fact, (7)
whether cross-examination could help to show the declarant's lack of knowledge, (8) the
possibility that the declarant's recollection was faulty because the event was remote, and (9)
whether the circumstances surrounding the statement suggest that the declarant misrepre-
sented the defendant's involvement. Id at *4-5.
39. Id. at *6. Sylvia's second statement failed seven out of the nine factors, and the
court found that one factor was irrelevant in this situation. Id. at *4-5.
40. Id. at *7.
41. Crawford 11, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002).
2005]
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Division, the court relied on its decision in State v. Rice42 to declare that
"interlocking" confessions could satisfy the reliability requirement as an
alternative to the nine factor test.43 The court rejected the court of appeals
conclusion that the couple's statements contradicted each other, finding
instead that the statements actually overlapped.44 It based this conclusion on
the idea that both Michael and Sylvia's statements were equally ambiguous
as to whether Lee actually had a weapon because both indicated that it was
possible that he grabbed for a weapon either before or after the assault.
45
The court deemed the couple's statements to be "virtually identical" thus
satisfying the interlocking confessions rule and the residual reliability test of
the Confrontation Clause.46
III. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has struggled for decades to distin-
guish the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause as a categorical right
separate from the rule against hearsay.47 One reason for this struggle may be
42. 844 P.2d 416 (Wash. 1993). In Rice, the Washington Supreme Court adopted dicta
from Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), to conclude that when the statements of co-
defendants are "virtually identical" they can be deemed reliable as "interlocking" confessions
in place of other reliability tests. Id. at 427. In Lee, the United States Supreme Court rejected
Illinois's contention that the reliability of a co-defendant's statement was insured because it
interlocked with that of the defendant and stated that "when the discrepancies between the
statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not be admitted." 476
U.S. at 545. The Court would discount this inference by the Washington Supreme Court
claiming that if it had intended to announce a new exception to the Confrontation Clause it
would have done so in a more clear and authoritative manner. Crawford 111, 541 U.S. 36, 57-
58 (2004).
43. Crawford I, 54 P.3d at 661.
44. Id. at 664.
45. Id. The court sided with the dissent from the court of appeals. Id. That dissent
stated:
Whether or not Lee was armed is certainly critical to Michael's claim of self-
defense. But any dissimilarity in the Crawfords' statements regarding Lee being
armed is minor. The majority confuses these two considerations and wrongly
concludes that because the statements are slightly dissimilar on a critical issue,
there is a critical difference between the two statements. I disagree.
CrawfordlI, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 WL 850119, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001) (Arm-
strong, C.J., dissenting).
46. Crawford 11, 54 P.3d at 664. The United States Supreme Court later criticized this
statement and pointed out that the "ambiguity of the two statements made it all the more
imperative that they be tested to tease out the truth." Crawford 111, 541 U.S. at 67. The Court
also pointed out that the prosecutor did not seem to share in the Washington Supreme
Court's opinion that the statements were ambiguous because during his closing argument he
called Sylvia's statement 'damning evidence' that 'completely refutes [petitioner's] claim of
self-defense."' Id.
47. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO.
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that American history gives no clear origin of the right in this country.48
Traditionally, it has been traced to the abuses of the English courts in the
century preceding the American Revolution, and at least some of its roots
may be found in the transgressions of the Crown in the American colonies.49
This section briefly addresses the historical reasons for the inclusion of the
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment. 50 Then, it moves on to dis-
cuss the early American case law concerning the Confrontation Clause."1
Next, the section reviews the cases preceding Ohio v. Roberts.52 Finally, this
section analyses the Roberts decision.53
A. The History Surrounding the Drafting of the Clause: The Framers'
Intentions
1. The Influence of the English Courts
The traditional view is that the Framers drafted the Confrontation
Clause because of the "remembered harms or injuries suffered or feared by
the colonists" that were linked to the abuses in the English courts of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.54 It was the political trials of this time
and the proceedings of the Star Chamber 55 that would lead to reforms after
the Glorious Revolution.
56
In the sixteenth century the English courts adopted trial techniques
from the civil law countries that gave criminal proceedings an inquisitorial
approach. 7 The political cases were assigned to the Privy Counsel,58 which
L.J. 1011, 1014-15 (1998).
48. See Larkin, supra note 2, at 67.
49. See generally Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern
Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381 (1959).
50. See infra at Part III.A.
51. See infra at Part III.B.1.
52. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see infra at Part III.B.2.
53. See infra at Part III.B.3.
54. Larkin, supra note 2, at 67,70.
55. The Star Chamber was a division of the English courts where criminal cases of
misdemeanor were tried without a jury. 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 325, 337-38 (1883).
56. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 577 (1992). The Glo-
rious Revolution was an English civil war that ended with the replacement of James II with
William and Mary. 2 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 77 (1998). It was the pre-
cursor to the English Bill of Rights, which was passed in 1689 and advanced individual
freedoms while restricting the power of the monarch. Id. Parts of the English Bill of Rights
served as a model for the fledgling state governments and America's own Bill of Rights. See
id.
57. Berger, supra note 56, at 569.
58. The Privy Council is the private council of the British Crown, which derived from
2005]
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examined the accused in preparation for trial, sometimes resorting to torture
in order to exact a confession.5 9 Witnesses did not testify in open court; in-
stead, their statements were presented in the form of depositions, letters, and
accomplice confessions that had been taken during examination by the
Counsel.60 It was this lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
that led to the repeated requests by the prisoners to have the witnesses
brought before them face-to-face.6t
This procedure was adopted in Sir Walter Raleigh's infamous trial for
treason in 1603.62 The principal evidence against Raleigh was the confes-
sion of his alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham.63 During trial, the court
repeatedly rejected Raleigh's request to have Cobham brought before him.
64
Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to be hanged, drawn, and quartered.65
Raleigh's conviction was later lamented as a debasement of the English
justice system.66
the King's Council of the Middle Ages. 8 WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 173
(1998). The Council once wielded great administrative power, but after the civil wars in
England it lost most of its power and now its function in mainly ceremonial. See id.
59. STEPHEN, supra note 55, at 325.
60. Id. at 326. The judges during that period did not adhere to any code of evidence as
we know it today. See id. at 336. The only distinction they made between the different kinds
of evidence was between eyewitness evidence and all other kinds of evidence. Id. Also the
defendant had no right to counsel, no means of procuring evidence, and no right to admit
evidence in a proceeding, leaving the prisoner almost completely subject to the court. Id. at
337. Additionally, the jury had almost absolute freedom to base their decision on whatever
they deemed to be evidence, including their own personal knowledge. See id. at 336-37.
61. Id. at 326.
62. See id. at 333-36. The indictment charged Raleigh with conspiring with Lord Cob-
ham to oust James I and advance Arabella Stuart to the throne. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2
How. St. Tr. 1 (1603) [hereinafter Raleigh].
63. STEPHEN, supra note 55, at 333. Contrary to the modern view of accomplice confes-
sions, the prosecution in Raleigh's case declared that accusations that are also self-
inculpatory for the accuser are the most forcible sort of evidence. Raleigh, supra note 62, at
7. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (confessions by an accomplice inculpating
the principal are "presumptively suspect").
64. Raleigh, supra note 62, at 15-18. The court cited various reasons for rejecting Ra-
leigh's requests. For instance, if Raleigh were allowed to confront Cobham, Cobham might
be influenced to change his story by his loyalty to Raleigh and by Raleigh's persuasiveness.
Id. at 17-18. Ironically, the court claimed that if the accused was allowed to confront his
accusers few prosecutions for treason would ever lead to guilty verdicts. Id.
65. Id. at 31. Raleigh did not go quickly to his death. He lived another fourteen years in
the Tower, and in 1616 King James I decided to utilize him by sending him on an expedition
to Guinea in search of gold. Id. at 32. The voyage was unsuccessful, and Raleigh lost his
fortune and his son to the excursion. Id. at 34. When he returned to England he was again
imprisoned and brought before the King's Bench for the enforcement of the judgment of
execution against him. Id. at 33. The king considered bringing a new charge against Raleigh
for breach of the peace, but decided against it because of the experience with Raleigh's wit
and abilities in the first trial. Id. Raleigh was condemned to death. Id. at 34-35.
66. See White, supra note 2, at 543.
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2. The Influences in the Colonies
There is another perhaps more compelling argument that the most sig-
nificant impact upon the framers came from the various influences within
the colonies during the pre-Revolutionary era.67 Aside from the troubles in
England, the cotaies faced their own probtems with the poor administra-
tion of justice, beginning with the abuses of authority by the early colonial
governors.68 As the founders of new colonies learned from the mistakes
made by their seniors, provisions were made in the new governments, and
the right to confrontation and cross-examination gradually became part of
colonial criminal procedure by the beginning of the eighteenth century.69
Around the time of the French and Indian War, the Crown's admini-
stration in the colonies began to exhibit increased weakness and unfairness
that adversely affected the right to trial by jury.70 The first of these injustices
occurred with the attempt to enforce the Sugar Act in 1763 and the Stamp
Act in 1765.71 When the colonial courts resisted the enforcement of the new
laws, which they regarded as unconstitutional, Parliament granted jurisdic-
tion over those cases to the admiralty courts.72 In the admiralty courts the
defendants were not afforded a trial by jury, and the procedures in those
courts made frequent use of testimony by deposition and ex parte examina-
tions of witnesses. 73 In addition to the Sugar Act and Stamp Act prosecu-
tions, Parliament called for persons charged with certain treasonous acts to
be sent to England for trial, which severely limited their trial rights.74 The
outrage over these cases was probably fueled by contemporary publications
67. See Larkin, supra note 2, at 70-72.
68. See Pollitt, supra note 49, at 390-95. The earliest examples come from Virginia
where, in 1702, the Virginia Council complained that Governor Nicholson encouraged
"sycophants" and "tattlers" and conducted ex parte examinations and tampered with the
results from these examinations all while not allowing the accused the right to confront his
accusers. Id. at 391. Massachusetts did not have a stable system of justice, and the colonists
were not allowed knowledge of the offenses they could be charged with and the procedures
the court would use against them until 1641. Id. at 392.
69. See id. at 393-95.
70. Larkin, supra note 2, at 71. The French and Indian War took place from 1754-63.
Id.
71. Pollitt, supra note 49, at 396. England was in severe debt after the French and In-
dian War and in response enacted taxes on the colonies; Charles Townsend, acting as the first
Lord of Trade called for the strict enforcement of these new laws and of the existing trade
laws that had grown lax in previous years. Id
72. Id at 396-97.
73. Id. at 397.
74. Larkin, supra note 2, at 71-72. Transporting the accused to England denied him the
right to a jury drawn from the locality where the alleged crime took place, limited his right to
challenge the jurors, deprived him of an ability to call witnesses for his defense, and almost




such as William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England that
advocated the superiority of trial by jury and the rights it encompassed over
other modes of criminal procedure. 5
As a result of these influences, when the original draft of the constitu-
tion contained little mention of criminal procedure, the states vehemently
refused to ratify it.7 6 Several of the states had already included a right to
trial by jury and a right to confrontation in their constitutions and declara-
tions of rights, and it was contended in the Federal Convention of 1787 that
the state declarations would be sufficient to protect these rights.7 After the
states voiced strong objections, however, a full bill of rights was amended
to the Constitution, which included the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause.78 With the inclusion of the Sixth Amendment and the Confrontation
Clause the framers furthered their purpose of employing a checks and bal-
ances system to limit the powers of the sovereign.79
75. See Berger, supra note 56, at 581-83. Blackstone's Commentaries enjoyed an avid
readership in the colonies and had a profound impact on the development of the early Ameri-
cans' attitude towards the legal system. Larkin, supra note 2, at 72. In a significant passage
Blackstone praised the examination of witnesses in open court as opposed to the old civil law
practices. Id. Blackstone wrote:
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is
much more conducive to the clearing up of the truth, than the private and secret
examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesi-
astical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law:
where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he will be ashamed
to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or careless scribe may
make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his depositions in his
own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to correct and explain his
meaning, if misunderstood, which he can never do after a written deposition is
once taken. Besides the occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the
counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much
better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and settled: and the
confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportunity of obtaining a clear
discovery, which can never be had upon any other method of trial.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373 (2d. ed. 1768).
76. One example of the discussions raised in the state conventions comes from Abra-
ham Holmes's comments in the Massachusetts convention:
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether the criminal is to be al-
lowed the benefit of counsel; whether he is to be allowed to meet with his ac-
cuser face to face; whether he is allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the
advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told.
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 420 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].
77. Larkin, supra note 2, at 76. States with provisions similar to the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause included Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Vermont, and Virginia. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 402-13.
78. Larkin, supra note 2, at 76.
79. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 100-01 (1995).
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B. The Interpretations of the Confrontation Clause
1. The First Discussion of the Confrontation Clause: Mattox v.
United States
The United States Supreme Court gave the Confrontation Clause little
treatment until the late 1800s when the court decided Mattox v. United
States.8° In Mattox, the defendant had been convicted of murder but was
awarded a retrial; however, some of the witnesses who testified at the first
trial had died during the interim.81 During the second trial, the prosecution
admitted the reporter's notes of the two deceased witnesses' testimony from
the first trial.82
Because both of the deceased witnesses had appeared at the first trial
and had been fully examined and cross-examined, the Supreme Court re-
jected the defendant's claim that his right to confrontation had been vio-
lated. 3 The Court stressed that the "primary object" of the Confrontation
Clause was to prevent the use of the inquisitorial techniques of the civil law
(ex parte affidavits) by offering a method for deciphering the truth-cross-
examination.84 The Court then stated that a constitutional provision should
not be construed so narrowly as to harm the interest of the public in order to
protect a defendant, when the defendant had been previously afforded the
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.85 The Court indicated that the
Bill of Rights was subject to the common law at 1791 and all of its excep-
tions.86 The Confrontation Clause was subject even to those exceptions that
strayed from its purposes because they were grounded in experience that
had shown them to be of the same reliability and trustworthiness as testi-
mony that was taken under oath.87 These statements might have opened the
80. Id. In Aaron Burr's trial for treason in 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall briefly
mentioned the right to confrontation in dicta, but the opinion mainly focused on the hearsay
rule and its exceptions. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (D. Va. 1807).
81. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 240-42. The court cited several state cases to prove that the admission of such
evidence was the general practice across the country. Id. at 241.
84. Id. at 242. The court praised cross-examination stating:
The accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollectiori and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.
Id. at 242-43.
85. See id. at 243.
86. Id.
87. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44. The Court drew upon the example of dying decla-
rations, in which the defendant is rarely afforded the opportunity to come face-to-face with a
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door for the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" and "indicia of reliability"
tests that would be employed in the future.
88
2. The Development of a Doctrine: The Precursors to Ohio v. Rob-
erts89
The Court did not address a great number of confrontation cases after
Mattox until 1965 when it decided Pointer v. Texas.90 The court in Pointer
held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies to criminal
trials in the state courts by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 Until
Pointer there was no urgency to formulate a doctrine for applying the Con-
frontation Clause to out-of-court statements because the states simply ap-
plied their own rules of evidence to such situations.92 After Pointer, some
statements that had previously been admissible in the states were now
barred by a constitutional provision.93 Thus, it became much more pressing
for the Court to devise a doctrine for the Clause's application. 94 John Henry
Wigmore's treatise on evidence influenzed the Cout's decisions folowing
Pointer.95 Wigmore's theory endorsed the Confrontation Clause as an evi-
dentiary doctrine-a constitutionalization of the rules against hearsay that
essentially consisted of an absolute right to cross-examination. 96 Thus, ac-
cording to Wigmore, when the hearsay rule required that a statement be
taken in court, the Confrontation Clause required that it be taken subject to
cross-examination and the current rules of evidence.97
dying declarant. Id. The Court stated that dying declarations are admissible because "the
sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce
as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath." Id at 244.
88. White, supra note 2, at 558-59.
89. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
90. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
91. Id. at 403. Pointer was a test case indicative of the Confrontation Clause violations
occurring in the states. Id. at 401-02. In Pointer a robbery victim testified at a preliminary
hearing that Pointer was one of his assailants. Id. at 401. Before trial, however, the witness
moved out of state, and the prosecution declared him unavailable for trial. Id. The prosecu-
tion was allowed to admit the transcript from the preliminary hearing even though the defen-
dant had not been represented by counsel and had not attempted to cross-examine the witness
at the preliminary hearing. Id.
92. Friedman, supra note 47, at 1014.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Berger, supra note 56, at 592.
96. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 128-31 (3d. ed. 1940). Wigmore inferred
that the terms confrontation and cross-examination could be used almost interchangeably.
See id. at 128-29.
97. Id. at 130. Wiginore thought that the Framers intended the Clause to be subject to
exceptions, but that they did not wish to enumerate them. Id. at 131.
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a. The sufficiency of the opportunity to cross-examine: Barber
v. Page
Shortly after Pointer the Court was called upon to answer one of the
many questions concerning the application of the Confrontation Clause in
Barber v. Page.98 The issue in Barber was whether the defendant had been
given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine when the witness's prior tes-
timony was given at a preliminary hearing. 99 Barber and his co-defendants
were charged with committing armed robbery in Oklahoma, and at the pre-
liminary hearing, Woods, one of the co-defendants, waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and gave testimony that incriminated Barber. 00
Barber's attorney did not cross-examine Woods.' 0' When Barber's trial ar-
rived seven months later, Woods was incarcerated in a federal prison in
Texas.' O2 The state claimed that Woods was unavailable as a witness be-
cause he was out of the jurisdiction and sought to admit the transcript of his
preliminary hearing testimony.1
0 3
Initially, the Court scolded the prosecution for even claiming that the
witness was unavailable because of the ease with which the state could ob-
tain his presence due to the growing cooperation between the federal and
state prison systems.' °4 The Court held that a witness is unavailable only
when the prosecution can show that it made a good faith effort to procure
his presence at trial.1
05
Next the Court rejected the State's argument that the defendant had
waived his right to confront Woods because he did not take advantage of his
opportunity to do so at the preliminary hearing.' 0 6 The Court proclaimed
that even if Barber had cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing, it
would not have been sufficient because confrontation was "basically a trial
107
right" reserved to give the jury the opportunity to scrutinize the witness.
The Court further explained stating that "[a] preliminary hearing is ordinar-
98. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
99. Id. at 720.
100. Id.
101. Id. Counsel for one of the other co-defendants did cross-examine Woods. Id.
102. Id. The prison was in Texarkana, Texas approximately 225 miles from the Okla-
homa court. Id.
103. ld. at 720.
104. Barber, 390 U.S. at 723-24. The Court claimed that the old idea that once a witness
left a state he was rendered impossible to produce had grown obsolete because of the rising
cooperation between the states and within the prison systems. Id.
105. Id. at 724-25.
106. Id. at 725. The Court asserted that Barber's failure to cross-examine Woods at the
preliminary hearing could hardly qualify as a waiver because he could not have known that




ily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial,
simply because its function is [a] more limited one" 10 8 In dicta, however, the
Court skirted its critical statements saying that there may be a necessity and
a good argument for admission of preliminary hearing testimony in some
cases in which the witness was actually unavailable.' 09
b. The beginnings of a test: California v. Green
Just two years after Barber, the Court decided California v. Green," I 0 a
case that disregarded Barber and set the stage for the new tests that would
arose in the following years."' In Green a sixteen-year-old boy testified that
Green was his drug supplier at Green's preliminary hearing for drug
charges. 12 At trial, however, the boy claimed uncertainty as to this point
because he had been under the influence of LSD." 3 During the boy's direct
examination, the prosecution read excerpts from his preliminary hearing
testimony and submitted the previous testimony as substantive evidence.' 
4
After the boy's statement was read, he claimed that his memory was "re-
freshed" and proceeded to tell a muddled account of the incident."' The
District Court of Appeals later held, and the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, that the admission of the boy's prior testimony implicated Green's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation even if it was subject to cross-
examination because the prior inconsistent statements were admitted as sub-
stantive evidence." 16
The United States Supreme Court rejected the California court's deci-
sion, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated as long as the
witness was subjected to cross-examination at trial. 1 7 The Court attempted
to bolster this argument by weighing the "alleged dangers" of admitting out-
of-court statements against the Confrontation Clause's protections. 18 The
Court stated that the Confrontation Clause provides the following:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath thus im-
pressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 725-26.
110. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 151.
113. Id. at 151-52. The boy claimed to have taken "acid" twenty minutes prior to
Green's phone call about the marijuana. Id. at 152.
114. Id. at 152.
115. Id. at 152. On cross-examination he testified that his memory had been "refreshed"
as to the preliminary hearing, not as to the actual incident. Id.
116. Green, 399 U.S. at 153.




lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for
discovery of the truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defen-
dant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his state-
ment, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.1
19
The Court concluded that, in light of this balancing test, Green's op-
portunity to confront the witness was sufficient because Green had the op-
portunity for "full and effective cross-examination," the conditions of trial
were present, and the jury was provided an opportunity to scrutinize the
witness's testimony regarding his prior statements. 120 The Court claimed
that the question was not whether the jury could be in a better position to
experience the prior testimony, but whether the jury could still obtain a "sat-
isfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."'
2 1
Then, in part III of the opinion, the Court seemingly discounted what it
had held two years earlier in Barber concerning the sufficiency of prelimi-
nary hearing testimony.122 Instead of acknowledging the Barber holding that
preliminary hearing testimony is not of the same degree as trial testimony,
the Court concluded that the prior testimony in this case was taken "under
circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical trial"
and was thus sufficient. 123 The Court relied upon dicta from Barber that
stated that preliminary hearing testimony might be satisfactory in some cir-
cumstances to infer that the boy's prior statement would have been admissi-
ble even if the boy had been unavailable for trial because there was "sub-
stantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation require-
ment.'
124
c. Expanding on the test: Dutton v. Evans
In Dutton v. Evans, 25 the Court added another condition to the test that
the court would adopt in Roberts.'26 In that case Evans and his co-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 158-60. The majority based this conclusion partially upon the Mattox deci-
sion, claiming that it was not against the Confrontation Clause to admit out-of-court state-
ments of a witness who was available to testify at trial. Id. at 157-58. The court did not,
however, distinguish that the witness in Mattox was available and cross-examined at the first
trial rather than at a preliminary hearing. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
121. Id. at 161.
122. Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 166. In his dissent, Brennan criticized the majority's treatment of Barber
stating that "it ignores reality to assume that the purposes of the Confrontation Clause are
met during the preliminary hearing." Id. at 199 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
126. Id. Dutton was actually argued before Green, but it was scheduled for reargument
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conspirators Truett and Williams were charged with murder. 127 Truett
turned state's witness, and Williams was arraigned and imprisoned in the
federal penitentiary before Evans's trial.' 28 At Evans's trial, Shaw, one of
Williams's fellow inmates, testified that Williams had made a comment to
him that implicated Evans as the mastermind of the scheme. 129 The state
claimed that Shaw's statement was admissible under a Georgia hearsay ex-
ception that allowed the admission of statements made by a co-conspirator
during the commission of the conspiracy or during the time the co-
conspirators are continuing to conceal the crime. 3 ' Evans claimed that his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been violated by the admission
of Shaw's hearsay statement.'
3'
The plurality opinion began by distinguishing this case from the
Court's recent decisions regarding co-conspirators, claiming that those cases
far out-weighed the case at bar in regards to the significance of the admitted
evidence. 32 Then the Court decided that the state's longstanding hearsay
exception regarding co-conspirators was applied in a manner consistent with
the Confrontation Clause.33 The Court supported this Zoclusioan by stating
that the rule against hearsay does not restrict a witness from telling what he
heard; rather, the rule prevented the use of extra-judicial statements to prove
fact. 13 4 The Court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the making
of Williams's statement bore "indicia of reliability," which were considered
to be determinative of whether a statement could be admitted into evidence
without an opportunity for confrontation.
3 5
and was decided in the term following the Green decision. Id. at 76-77.
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. at 77.
129. Id. at 77-78. Shaw testified that when Williams arrived back to his cell after his
arraignment he stated, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now." Id. at 77. Truett, however, was the principal witness for the prose-
cution, and both he and Shaw were fully cross-examined by defense counsel. Id. at 77-78.
130. Id. at 78.
131. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77-78.
132. Id. at 87.
133. Id. at 87-88.
134. Id. at 88. The Court recognized that the possibility of a constitutional violation arose
because Shaw's statement encouraged the jury to conclude that Williams had implicitly
identified Evans as the one who murdered the victims. Id. The Court, however, proceeded to
list the ways in which Evans's confrontation right was not denied by showing the reliability
of Williams's statement. Id. at 88-89.
135. Id. at 89. The circumstances bearing "indicia of reliability" were that Williams made
the statement against his penal interest and that it was a spontaneous utterance. Id. The Court
went on to remark that "the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably
have shown the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable was wholly
unreal." Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the admission of Shaw's
statement was "harmless error if it was error at all." Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall, however, dissented, stating that Shaw's statement put Evans's case in very
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3. The Birth of a Doomed Doctrine: Ohio v. Roberts
In Ohio v. Roberts,'36 the Court unveiled its long-awaited approach to
the Confrontation Clause.' 37 In Roberts, the defendant was charged with
forgery of a check and possession of stolen credit cards that belonged to
Bernard and Amy Isaacs. 3 8 At the preliminary hearing, the defense called
the Isaacs's daughter, Anita, to testify and attempted to draw out an admis-
sion that she had given the defendant permission to use the checks and
credit cards, but she denied these assertions.' 39 Defense counsel did not
cross-examine Anita or declare her a hostile witness. 40 When time for trial
arrived, Anita could not be located at her last permanent address, and the
prosecution declared her unavailable and admitted her preliminary hearing
statements. 141
The defendant contended that his rights under the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause had been violated and advanced the two following
arguments: (1) that the defendant did not enjoy a sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, and (2) that the state did not make a good faith
effort to obtain the witness's presence. 142 The majority focused mainly on
the first argument. 43 The Court began by stating that the Confrontation
Clause should not be read so narrowly that all prior statements would be
inadmissible. 44 The Court advanced the argument first set out in Mattox
that the competing interests of protecting the defendant's rights and protect-
ing the public must be balanced to determine whether confrontation could
real danger and that this was the very kind of situation in which cross-examination was
needed to sift out the truth. See id. at 103-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall was also
wary of the Court's use of "indicia of reliability" to admit the statement, claiming that this
approach would undermine the Confrontation Clause's purpose if any statement could be
admitted on a showing of reliability. Id. at 109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 58.
139. Id. Anita did testify that she had allowed the defendant to live in her apartment
while she had been away for several days. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 59. Five subpoenas had been issued to Anita at her parent's home over a pe-
riod of five months. Id. The defense objected to the state's assertion that Anita was unavail-
able, and a voir dire hearing was held in which her mother, Amy, testified that her family had
been unable to locate Anita after the preliminary hearing. Id at 59-60.
142. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62, 74.
143. See id. at 62-73. In part IV of the opinion the court quickly dismissed the defen-
dant's argument that the prosecution had not made a good faith showing of the witness's
unavailability. See id. at 74-77. The Court contrasted Barber in which the prosecution knew
the exact location of the witness and made no effort to procure him with this case in which
the prosecution and the witness's family had no idea as to her whereabouts. Id.
144. Id. at 63.
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be dispensed with in a particular case.145 It then mapped out the two ways in
which the Clause was designed to restrict admissibility of hearsay. 46 First, a
threshold requirement had to be met in which the prosecution proved the
unavailability of the witness whose statement it wished to use.' 47 For the
second step, the prior statement must bear adequate "indicia of reliability," a
requirement that could be satisfied if the statement (1) felt within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or (2) bore "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness."'' 48 The Court declined to identify any particular "guarantees of
trustworthiness"; rather, it referred to dicta in Green to assert that "substan-
tial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement"
was all that the Sixth Amendment demanded.
49
In part III of the opinion the Court compared the facts of Roberts to
those in Green to determine whether the "indicia of reliability" requirement
had been met. 150 The Court drew on Green to conclude that the Confronta-
tion Clause was satisfied when the defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at a preliminary hearing even without the actual occur-
ren ce of cross-examjatjo,' 51 The Court then concluded that the Confronta-
tion Clause was satisfied in this case because on direct examination the de-
fense counsel engaged in "cross-examination as a matter of form" by using
very leading questions in order to challenge the truth of the witness's state-
145. Id. at 64.
146. Id. at 65.
147. Id. at 65. Six years later in United States v. Inadi, the Court held that the unavail-
ability requirement was not necessary for the admission of co-conspirator statements. See
475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986). Due to the nature of these statements, cross-examination of co-
conspirators would lend little to the finding out of the truth. Id. The Court decided that the
burden of proving unavailability in such cases would outweigh the benefit that could be
reaped from producing the declarant at trial. See id. at 398-400. A year later in Bourjaily v.
United States, the Court held that the "indicia of reliability" requirement did not apply in the
case of co-conspirator's statements. 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
148. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. The Court bolstered the "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion" prong of the test by referring to the dying declarations example set forth in Mattox to
show that some hearsay exceptions are based on such firm foundations of reliability and
trustworthiness that they will always comport with the Confrontation Clause. Id at 66 (citing
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
149. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69. In Idaho v. Wright, the Court gave a rough guideline of
how to determine whether a statement bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
497 U.S. 805 (1990). The Court held that a court must look to the "totality of the circum-
stances that surround the making of the statement" to determine whether the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" had been met. Id. at 820. The Court rejected the argument that
a statement was reliable if there was other evidence corroborating it. Id. at 822. The Court
stated that this would risk the "admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by boot-
strapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial," a result that they found to be
contrary to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 823.
150. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73.
151. Id. at 69-70.
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ments. 152 This approach was destined to create instability in the lower
courts, to be ridiculed by commentators and members of the Court, and ul-
timately to be dissolved by Crawford v. Washington.'
53
IV. REASONING
In Crawford v. Washington,154 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment mandates that the
common law requirements of unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination be met for the admission of prior testimonial state-
ments.155 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, began with a dis-
cussion of the history behind the right of confrontation. 56 Then the Court
moved on to present two conclusions it had reached about the Framers' in-
tentions behind writing the Confrontation Clause.1 57 Finally, the Court con-
cluded that the Ohio v. Roberts'58 "guarantees of trustworthiness" and
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" tests produced results that ran counter to
the original purposes of the Confrontation Clause 5 9 and, thus, overruled
Roberts.
60
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice
O'Connor joined.16 1 The Chief Justice concurred in the outcome but dis-
sented from the majority's decision to overrule Roberts.'62 The concurring
opinion stressed that Roberts and its progeny were not in conflict with the
Clause's history and that the majority's categorical exclusion of testimonial
statements was an arbitrary move that did not fully serve the framers' pur-
poses. 163
152. Id. at 70-71.
153. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For examples of the instability caused in the state and circuit
courts see infra Part IV.A.3.a. at n.207. For discussion of the criticism that Roberts received
see infra Part IV.A.3. at n.197.
154. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
155. Id. at 1374.
156. Id. at 1356, 1359-63.
157. Id. at 1363-67.
158. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
159. Crawfordlll, 124 S. Ct. at 1369-72.
160. See id. at 1374.
161. Id. at 1374-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
163. Id. at 1374-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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A. The Majority Opinion
1. The History of the Right of Confrontation
The Court began by tracing the history behind the right to confronta-
tion in England and America in order to determine the purposes behind the
Confrontation Clause.t64 First, it discussed the right of confrontation's roots
in the English common law as a reaction to the problematic civil law prac-
tices that were adopted in the English courts in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. 165 The majority accredited these trials with prompting re-
forms in the English system and the resulting requirements of witness un-
availability and prior opportunity for cross-examination. 166 Moving on, the
Court discussed the controversial practices in the colonies during the pre-
Revolutionary period. 167 The discussion then shifted to the early adoption of
the right of confrontation by individual states, which lead to its inclusion in
the United States Constitution.'68
2. Two Propositions about the Confrontation Clause
The Court used the history and the text of the Sixth Amendment to
glean two propositions about its meaning.' 69 First, the Confrontation
Clause's principal aim was the defeat of the civil-law procedures that had
been abused by the English and early American courts. 170 Second, the
Framers would have only admitted prior testimonial statements if the wit-
ness was proven unavailable and the defendant had been afforded a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.' 7 '
a. The principal purpose of the Confrontation Clause
The Court first propositioned that the principal purpose of the Confron-
tation Clause was to combat the use of civil law practices in American
courts, particularly ex parte examinations. 172 Then, the Court rejected the
164. Id. at 1359-63.
165. Crawford III, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-60. The majority discussed the Raleigh case and
the criminal procedure statutes from that period. Id. at 1360.
166. Id. at 1360-61.
167. Id. at 1362.
168. Id. at 1362-63.
169. Id. at 1363.
170. Id.
171. Crawford111, 541 U.S. at 52.
172. Id. at 50.
[Vol. 27
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
view hypothesized by Wigmore that while the Confrontation Clause gov-
erns the admission of in-court testimony, the Clause's application to out-of-
court statements depends upon "the law of Evidence for the time being.'
173
The Court stressed the separation of the Confrontation Clause from the gen-
eral rule against hearsay, asserting that the Clause applies to those state-
ments that are akin to the ex parte examinations of the sixteenth century.'74
The Court drew upon the text of the Confrontation Clause to determine that
a "witness" is a person who "bear[s] testimony"; thus, the Clause is con-
cerned with a specific kind of out-of-court statement, a testimonial state-
ment. 175 Then the Court went on to list the various definitions of testimonial
statements that had been presented to it, such as affidavits and pretrial
statements made with the expectation of prosecution and trial.' 76 It con-
cluded that statements produced from interrogation by police officers qual-
ify as testimonial under any formulation because present day interrogations
by police are very similar to examinations conducted by justices of the
peace during the sixteenth century. 177
b. The common law requirements: unavailability and opportu-
nity to cross-examine
The Court's second proposition was that the right of confrontation
173. Id. at 51 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting I NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)). In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited his definition
of witness to include only sworn "testimonial" statements. See id at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). The Chief Justice stressed that the true concern of the judiciary at common law
was whether the statement sought to be admitted was made under oath, not whether it was
testimonial or non-testimonial. See id. Further, the Chief Justice claimed that the majority's
broad categorization that includes unsworn statements was not what the Framers intended.
Id. But, Justice Scalia retorted to this claim by asserting that it is "implausible that a provi-
sion which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn
exparte affidavit perfectly OK." Id. at 52 n.3.
176. Id. at 1364. See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford III, (No. 02-9410) (stating that
"ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori-
ally"); Brief of Amici Curiae, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., at 3,
Crawford I1 (No. 02-9410) (stating that "out-of-court statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial"); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that "extra-judicial
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions").
177. Crawfordfll, 541 U.S. at 52.
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should be interpreted subject to the requirements at common law in 1791.78
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Framers would not admit testimo-
nial statements unless it was proven that the witness was unavailable to tes-
tify at trial and the defendant had been provided a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.' 79 The majority stressed that prior opportunity
for cross-examination is more than just sufficient to satisfy the Clause-it is
a dispositive factor for a statement to be admissible.80 The Court acknowl-
edged that some exceptions to the Clause were present and established at
common law.' 81 The Court claimed, however, that there was little evidence
to show that they were used in criminal trials and the majority of such ex-
ceptions did not apply to testimonial statements. 82 Thus, the Court deter-
mined that the Framers would not have used these exceptions in the context
of prior testimony. 1
83
The Court went on, in section IV of the opinion, to discuss the ways in
which the case law supported these two propositions. 8 4 The Court ex-
plained that both the early case law and more recent decisions were consis-
tent with the majority's propositions, showing several instances in which the
Court required either a witness's unavailability or an adequate opportunity
for cross-examination. 18 5 The Court placed special emphasis on the decision
in Lee v. Illinois,186 on which the state court relied for different reasoning, to
show that Lee was not contradictory to these principals.
87
178. Id. at 54.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 55-56.
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id.
183. Crawford 111, 541 U.S. at 55. At footnote six of the opinion, the Court did recognize
the longstanding use of the dying declarations exception in criminal hearsay law-even
dying declarations that were testimonial in nature-but declined to address whether the ex-
ception was incorporated into the Sixth Amendment; rather, it let the exception stand on
historical grounds as being "sui generis." Id. at 1367 n.6.
184. Id. at 1367-69. The Court did admit that White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), was
contradictory to the requirement for prior opportunity to cross-examine, but declined to ad-
dress that case because the only question argued in White was necessity of the unavailability
requirement in respect to the spontaneous declarations hearsay exception. Id. at 1368 n.8. In
White the Court affirmed the admission of the statements of a child victim of sexual abuse to
a police officer and medical personnel under the hearsay exceptions of spontaneous utter-
ances and statements made in the course of securing medical treatment. 502 U.S. at 350-51.
The Court relied on its opinion in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), to conclude
that the unavailability prong of the Roberts analysis applied only to statements made in a
prior judicial proceeding. Id. at 354. Relying further on Inadi, the Court held that the un-
availability requirement did not apply to the hearsay exceptions in White, which addressed
statements with a certain inherent reliability that could not be reproduced at trial. See id. at
354-56.
185. CrawfordIll, 541 U.S. at 56-57.
186. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). For discussion of the Washington Supreme Court's use of Lee,
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3. The Problems with Ohio v. Roberts
In section V of the opinion the Court criticized the Ohio v. Roberts' 8
decision in light of the historical objectives of the Clause and the unstable
results created in the state and circuit courts of appeals. 89 The Court dis-
cussed how Roberts was unsatisfactory in that it was too broad because it
applied the "same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consistled]
of ex parte testimony" and too narrow because it "admit[ted] statements that
do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability."'1 90 The
Court acknowledged the criticisms of the Roberts approach, citing recent
opinions by members of the Court and works of commentators.' 9' Then, the
Court discussed the two proposals presented by those criticizing the Roberts
decision: (1) that the excessive broadness of Roberts could be eliminated if
the Confrontation Clause was applied only to testimonial statements, and (2)
that Roberts's extreme narrowness could be eliminated if the Clause was
read categorically to exclude all testimonial statements where the defendant
did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness., 92 Because the
first proposition was rejected in White v. Illinois, 9 and in light of the case
at bar, the Court chose an analysis based upon the second proposition.' 94
see supra Part.II.B.3. at note 42.
187. CrawfordIl, 541 U.S. at 59-60.
188. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
189. CrawfordIII, 541 U.S. at 60-68.
190. Id. at 60. The Court's reasoning on the overbreadth and excessive narrowness of the
Roberts approach follows Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116, 141-43 (1999). See id.
191. id. at 61. The Court cited Justice Breyers's concurring opinion in Lilly, which criti-
cized the Roberts analysis for being both too broad and too narrow. Id. Justice Breyer also
urged the Court to reevaluate the connection between the Sixth Amendment and the rule
against hearsay. Id. The Court also referred to Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1999), which argued for a narrow reading of the clause that
would apply to both infra judicial and extra judicial statements made in a formal testimonial
setting. Id. The Court also cited the works of commentators such as, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES, 125-31 (1997), which argue
that a distinction should be made between the confrontation clause and the rule against hear-
say and that the term witness should be read to refer to the maker of any statement prepared
for the purposes of trial. Id. The Court also cited Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The
Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1031 (1998), which argues that the right to
confrontation should apply to testimonial statements. Id.
192. Id.
193. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). In that case the United States, as amicus curiae, argued that the
Confrontation Clause was only concerned with the admission of evidence that was similar to
the dreaded ex parte affidavits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Id. at 352. The
United States further argued that declarants who made out-of-court statements in a context
different from this were not "witness[es] against" the accused and thus, other such statements
would be governed by the rules of hearsay. Id. The Court rejected this argument claiming
that "[sluch a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause, which would virtually eliminate
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a. The failings of Roberts and its progeny
The Court began its analysis of the flaws of Roberts by discussing the
conflict between the framers' intentions and the admission of testimonial
statements using judge-made tests of "reliability.' 95 While it recognized
that the "ultimate goal" of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliable
evidence, the Court suggested that the right of confrontation is a procedural
rather than a substantive right.196 It bolstered this idea by asserting that
proof of the reliability of evidence is not demanded before admission, but
rather it is ensured by the guaranteed procedure of cross-examination.1
97
The Court argued that by employing a judge-made reliability analysis, Rob-
erts had effectively nullified the very constitutional protection provided by
the Clause-the opportunity to confront the witness and thus show the reli-
ability or unreliability of his statement. 198 The majority proclaimed that
"[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty."'
199
The Court continued its criticism of Roberts by demonstrating the un-
predictability that it had produced in the state and circuit courts. 200 It argued
that reliability was an almost wholly subjective concept that yielded to
whatever test or set of factors a particular judge deemed necessary. 201 De-
spite its unpredictability, the most damning aspect of the Roberts test was its
tendency to allow admission of evidence absent an opportunity to cross-
its role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony, is foreclosed by our prior cases,"
and it stated that the United States's argument "comes too late in the day to warrant reexami-
nation of this approach." Id. at 352-53.




198. Id. at 62. The Court asserted that the reason the method used at Raleigh's trial was
unjust was not because the judges had made a faulty evaluation of the reliability of Lord
Cobham's confession, but because Raleigh had not been allowed the opportunity to confront
Cobham and show the degree of reliability in his testimony. Id.
199. Id. at 62-63.
200. CrawfordI11, 541 U.S. at 63.
201. Id. The Court listed several examples of the differing results in the lower courts,
especially those in which different courts read the same significance into opposite fact pat-
terns. Id. Compare People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (holding statement more
reliable because the inculpation of the defendant was "detailed") with United States v. Pho-
togrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a statement
was more reliable because the implication of the defendant was "fleeting"). Compare Nowlin
v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (finding a statement is more
reliable because the witness made it while in police custody) with State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d
913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (finding the statement more reliable because it was made
while the witness was not in custody).
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examine and thus, being completely contrary to the purpose of the
Clause. 20 2 Finally, the Court expressed its dismay at the fact that some
courts admitted testimonial statements absent an opportunity to cross-
examine simply because of the very elements that made them testimonial,
such as being taken under oath or while in police custody.20 3 The Court de-
clared that it is not enough that a statement is made in a testimonial setting
with "most of the usual safeguards of the adversary process" when the one
factor required by the Clause, the opportunity to cross-examine, is miss-
ng204ing.
2°
b. Application to the case at bar
The Court continued its criticism of Roberts by showing the differing
results it had produced in the procedural history of the case at bar. 205 The
Court pointed out that each of the lower courts that heard Crawford's case
employed different methods for determining whether or not the prior testi-
monial statement was reliable.20 6 Further, the lower courts made inferences
about the reliability of the evidence that could have been remedied by a
mere opportunity to cross-examine and draw out the real truth of the mat-
ter.20 7 Finally, the Court refused to dispose of this case easily by applying its
own reliability analysis. 208 Instead, it chose to take the opportunity to over-
rule Roberts, holding that testimonial statements are inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless the witness has been
shown to be unavailable and the defendant has been afforded a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness. 20 9 The Court declined to provide a
"comprehensive definition" of a testimonial statement, but it did provide
some examples that it would include in that category, "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and.., police
interrogations. ,210 Thus, in light of its holding, the Court found that the ad-
202. Crawford 111, 541 U.S. at 63. The Court discussed the plurality's statement in Lilly
that the accomplice statements implicating the accused would probably not pass the Roberts
test, and the resulting admission of such statements by several lower courts. Id.
203. Id. at 64-65.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 66.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 66-67. The Court discussed the weight that the Washington Supreme Court
placed upon the interlocking nature of the defendant and his wife's statements. Id at 1373.
The Washington Court thought that the statements were interlocking because they were both
ambiguous on the point of whether the victim had a weapon, but the Court found that this
ambiguity was the very thing that called for cross-examination. Id.
208. Crawford 111, 541 U.S. at 66-67.
209. Id. at 68.
210. Id. The Court also implied that guilty plea allocutions were testimonial in Part V.B.
of the opinion. Id. at 65.
2005]
UALR LAW REVIEW
mission of Sylvia's testimonial statement in the case at bar was a violation
of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and it reversed
and remanded the decision of the Washington Supreme Court.21'
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a concurring opinion that criticized
the majority's interpretation of the history of the right of confrontation and
its application of that history to Roberts.212 The Chief Justice argued that the
English judiciary of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not con-
cerned with whether a statement taken from an unavailable witness was
testimonial or non-testimonial.1 3 Rather, the judges at common law were
more concerned with whether a statement was taken under oath because un-
sworn statements were not considered to be substantive evidence and thus,
the oath requirement was considered before the confrontation require-
ment. He further argued that the majority's broad categorization of testi-
monial statements was inconsistent with history and the Court's precedent,
stating that the "classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of
sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy
for what the Framers might have intended.
2 15
The Chief Justice also did not think that the categorical exclusion of
testimonial statements was supported by the history behind the Clause be-
cause the law in both America and England concerning testimonial evidence
216was not uniform at the time of the framing. He argued that exceptions to
the general rule of exclusion existed at the time of the development of the
rules regarding out-of-court statements.1 7 Furthermore, the Chief Justice
stated that the Framers could not have intended to create a rigid rule of ex-
clusion when the law during their time was still devetoping. 218 The Chief
Justice argued in support of Ohio v. Roberts21 9 that the exceptions to the
general rule of exclusion of out-of-court statements had developed because
those types of statements were believed to be just as reliable as statements
211. Id. at 66-67.
212. Id. at 68-75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
213. Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, C.I., concurring).
214. CrawfordlIl, 541 U.S. at 68-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
215. Id. at 70-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
216. See id. 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia replied to this assertion by
discrediting the English sources that the Chief Justice cited, and he stressed that even if the
English rule was uncertain, the early state cases in America support the conclusion that the
common law right of confrontation was included in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 54 n.5.
217. Id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
218. Id.
219. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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made under cross-examination. 220 He recognized that cross-examination
was a very useful truth finding tool, but asserted that sometimes its use is
rendered needless by the reliability of the evidence sought to be admitted. 221
Finally, the Chief Justice concluded by warning against the danger of
overturning a quarter-century of precedent and leaving the criminal law
community with a new rule and no definitive way to apply it.
222
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Crawford v. Washington has been called "one of those rare Supreme
Court decisions that will come up on a daily basis in courts all over the
country. ' 223 Crawford replaces twenty-five years of case law with a new
and hopefully more stable approach to interpreting the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. The Court's refusal to give "testimonial" a compre-
hensive definition, however, may lead to inconsistent application of Craw-
ford in the lower courts. The abrogation of Ohio v. Roberts224 will also have
an effect on the law of hearsay. This section will attempt to show the further
significance of the Crawford decision through a discussion of all of these
issues.
A. Replacing a Balancing Test with a Categorical Right
Commentators have called for the termination of the Ohio v. Roberts
22 5
"indicia of reliability" approach for several years. The Roberts balancing
test has been criticized for its inadequate protection of the absolute constitu-
tional right of confrontation due to its malleability in the hands of judges. 6
Hopefully, the Court's holding in Crawford will appease these dissenters by
placing a categorical bar on all statements that are "testimonial" in nature,
where the witness was not proven unavailable or the defendant was not af-
forded a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 227 By overruling Roberts,
the Court shifts its approach towards the Confrontation Clause from an em-
phasis on the categorization of exceptions to a focus on the context in which
a statement is made. This shift should serve to do away with the numerous
220. Crawford I11, 541 U.S. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
221. Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
222. Id. (Renhquist, C.J., concurring).
223. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Bars Out-of-Court 'Testimonial' Statements, 40 TRIAL
82 (July 2004).
224. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
225. Id.
226. See Friedman, supra note 47, at 1031 (advocating a categorical rule that affords the
defendant the right to confront witnesses who make testimonial statements against the defen-
dant).
227. Crawford 11, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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and varied reliability tests used in the lower courts and to exclude those
statements that clearly violate the Confrontation Clause that would have
been admissible under a Roberts reliability analysis.228 Crawford should
thus promote the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by testing the reli-
ability of a declarant's statement in open court under cross-examination as
was intended by the Framers-not at the front door in the absence of a tuy.
The strong majority, in which seven justices supported the abrogation of
Roberts, foreshadows the Court's steadfast adherence to the new doctrine,
and once the lower courts adjust to applying the Crawford approach, it
should result in more consistent and homogenous outcomes than under the
previous doctrine.229
B. The Court's Refusal to Define "Testimonial"
While the Crawford approach seems promising, it is soiled by the
Court's refusal to comprehensively define "testimonial. 2 30 Given that the
Crawford approach is ptittcipaUy concerned with whether a statement is
testimonial, this void in the Court's decision makes it very difficult for
criminal trial attorneys to ascertain how to apply it.231 The Court did provide
a list of statements that it would deem testimonial, "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial... police inter-
rogations" and "plea allocution[s]. 232 The extension of this list beyond
228. See id at 62.
229. Crawford has already demonstrated the ease of its application in some lower court
decisions. See United States v. Hendricks, No. CRIM.2004-05 F/R, 2004 WL 1125143, at *2
(D. V.I., St. Croix Div. Apr. 27, 2004) (holding that the statements of a dead witness were
not admissible because the defendants did not have an opportunity for cross-examination);
see also People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 978-79 (Colo. 2004) (holding that because preliminary
hearings in Colorado do not provide the defendant an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination and the admission of preliminary hearing testimony is banned by the Sixth
Amendment).
230. For the Court's refusal to formulate a definition see Crawfordlll, 541 U.S. at 68.
231. See id at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
232. Id. at 64, 68. This compilation raises questions itself because some of the statements
it encompasses and that have been used by criminal prosecutors in the past will most likely
fail under a Crawford analysis. Testimony from a prior trial seems quite safe, assuming that
the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Grand jury testimony, however,
although it is made for the purposes of finding out the truth, may fail under Crawford be-
cause grand jury proceedings do not provide for cross-examination of witnesses. See FED. R.
CiM. P. 6(d). Statements made during police interrogations again will probably fail under
Crawford because they would rarely if ever provide for confrontation of the witness. Guilty
plea allocutions were once admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence 804 (b)(3) state-
ments against penal interest exception if they bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." See, e.g., United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2000). Now these
statements may be inadmissible unless the declarant is called as witness during trial. See,
e.g., United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that admission of
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statements made under oath, however, may open the door for various differ-
ent definitions of "testimonial" in the lower courts.
Beyond this specific list, the Court did give some general guidelines to
determine whether a statement is testimonial. Generally, the Court indicated
that testimonial statements are those with the "closest kinship to the abuses
at which the Con-frontation Clause was directed ., 233 The Court also drew
upon different definitions that it had been presented with by commentators
and members of the Court to draw a rough sketch of "testimonial" state-
ments as formalized statements made by a declarant in view of prosecution
and trial.234 Additionally, the Court's concern over statements made to gov-
ernment officials indicates that some of these statements, other than police
interrogations, might be regarded as testimonial in the future. 2" With these
vague descriptions in hand, the criminal justice system has an interesting
road to travel before the Supreme Court provides more details on its defini-
tion of "testimonial."
C. The Effects of the Court's Decisio n on Hearsay Law
Critics of Roberts presented the Court with two options: (1) to limit the
application of the Confrontation Clause to only testimonial statements and
leave the rest to governance by hearsay law, or (2) to impose an absolute bar
on the admission of testimonial statements absent an opportunity for cross-
examination.236 The Court chose to follow the second suggestion, indicating
that the Court might not yet be ready to release other kinds of hearsay from
the Confrontation Clause's grasp.237 This failure to relinquish control over
hearsay law calls into question what effect the Crawford decision will have
plea allocutions absent an opportunity for cross-examination violated the Confrontation
Clause under a Crawford analysis). Preliminary hearing testimony raises the issue presented
in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), of whether cross-examination at a preliminary hear-
ing is sufficient considering the difference in dynamics between a preliminary hearing and
trial. See id. at 725-26. For a discussion of Barber see supra Part.III.B.2.a. The Colorado
Supreme Court recently determined that preliminary hearing testimony was insufficient for
these reasons. See Fry, 42 P.3d at 977-79.
233. Crawford III, 541 U.S. at 68. This would seem to include such things as sworn
affidavits and depositions to the list of potential testimonial statements.
234. See id. at 51. The classification of "testimonial" statements as being made with the
expectation of prosecution raises interesting questions, such as how far this idea will be
carried in regards to statements made to police officers. Will a statement made by a passer-by
to a police officer that "X just committed the murder of Y" be regarded as a statement made
in view of prosecution, and thus testinionial?
235. See id. at 66.
236. Id. at 61.
237. See id The Court based this decision on the rejection of the first proposition in
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). The Court did recognize, however, that Crawford
would cast doubt on the White holding, but declined to address that point. Id.
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upon the exceptions to the rule against hearsay and by what means they will
be analyzed for admittance under the Confrontation Clause. One proposition
is that non-testimonial hearsay will continue to undergo an Ohio v. Rob-
erts238 reliability analysis. 239 Along those same lines it may be feasible to
apply requirements for admission under the Federal Rules of Evidence, es-
pecially the residual hearsay exception, which is similar to the doctrine un-
der Roberts.240 This approach seems to be consistent with the Court's objec-
tives in Crawford: "Where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' [s] design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law. 2 41 The Court did assure that some hearsay
exceptions will not be deemed testimonial, such as business records and
statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy.242 Some hearsay excep-
tions, however, walk the fine line between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements depending upon their particular fact pattern, and their admissibil-
ity will hinge on that factor. The Court indicated this by its hesitance to ad-
dress the dying declarations and the excited utterance exceptions, both of
which could very easily fall into either the testimonial or non-testimonial
category. 43
From these examples it seems that Crawford could have long resound-
ing effects on criminal trial procedure. Crawford promises stability in an
area of the law that has been a long time lost in a haze of uncertainty. Time
and experience will tell, however, whether Crawford will live up to this
promise or create more uncertainty by leaving criminal prosecutors with no
viable precedent.
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238. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
239. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d. 75, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying Roberts to non-
testimonial hearsay); see also Perkins v. State, No. CR-02-1779, 2004 WL 923506, at *6
(Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2004) (applying an analysis similar to Roberts).
240. See FED. R. EvID. 807.
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242. See id. at 56.
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discussion of testimonial spontaneous utterances see id at 58 n.8.
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